Failure pattern
Open exfiltration channel
Model output could carry data to an outside party, for example through a link or an image address.
Preventive controls from the record
| Incident | Control |
|---|---|
| INC-2025-0018 GitHub | Strip or expose hidden content before it reaches the assistant, and do not render remote images in assistant output. |
| INC-2025-0016 Salesforce | Treat form input as untrusted in agent context, and audit allow-listed domains for expiry and ownership. |
| INC-2025-0004 Microsoft | Separate untrusted inbound content from internal data in retrieval, and restrict the URLs an assistant’s output may reference. |
| INC-2024-0004 Slack (Salesforce) | Keep retrieved content from untrusted authors out of answers about private data, and do not render model-built links that can carry data out. |
Controls are editorial summaries by Incidents.si, not statements by the organizations involved.
4 incidents with this pattern
- CamoLeak: hidden pull request text could make Copilot Chat leak private code
Legit Security showed that a hidden comment in a pull request could instruct Copilot Chat to leak private repository content through GitHub’s own image proxy.
GitHub · Possible exfiltration of private source code and secrets; no exploitation reported
- ForcedLeak: a web form could make Salesforce Agentforce send out CRM data
Noma Security showed that text submitted through a public lead form could instruct Agentforce to send CRM data to an expired domain that Salesforce’s policy still trusted.
Salesforce · Possible exfiltration of CRM data; no exploitation in the wild reported
- EchoLeak: an email alone could make Microsoft 365 Copilot leak data
Aim Security found that a crafted email could cause Microsoft 365 Copilot to send data from a user’s context to an attacker with no click. Microsoft fixed it as CVE-2025-32711.
Microsoft · Possible exfiltration of data from Copilot’s context without any user action; no exploitation in the wild reported
- Researchers show Slack AI can be tricked into leaking private channel data
PromptArmor showed that a message in a public Slack channel could steer Slack AI into revealing data from a private channel the attacker could not access.
Slack (Salesforce) · Demonstrated exfiltration of a secret from a private channel; no exploitation reported
No incidents match these filters.