Failure pattern
Excessive permissions
The agent, or a credential it could reach, was able to do more than the task needed.
Preventive controls from the record
| Incident | Control |
|---|---|
| INC-2026-0006 LiteLLM (BerriAI) | Give agent platforms fine-grained tokens limited to the repositories and actions they need, and revoke any key that reaches a public repository at once. |
| INC-2026-0003 PocketOS | Scope infrastructure tokens to one environment and operation, keep them out of the repository, and store backups apart from the data. |
| INC-2026-0002 Amazon Web Services | Give agentic tools their own, narrower permissions and require peer review for production changes. |
| INC-2025-0013 Perplexity | Keep page content separate from user instructions, and require confirmation before the agent acts on another site. |
| INC-2025-0009 Amazon Web Services | Scope build tokens to the minimum, and require human review for every change that reaches a release. |
| INC-2025-0008 Replit | Separate production credentials and databases from development environments, and require approval for destructive commands. |
| INC-2025-0006 Supabase | Give agents read-only, project-scoped database access and never a key that bypasses access rules. |
| INC-2025-0003 GitHub | Scope the agent’s token to the repositories the task needs, and keep one repository per session. |
Controls are editorial summaries by Incidents.si, not statements by the organizations involved.
8 incidents with this pattern
- Leaked key to an internal agent platform leads to a malicious LiteLLM release
An attacker used a leaked key to LiteLLM’s internal agent platform to obtain an organization owner’s GitHub token, then rewired the release workflow to publish a credential stealer as litellm 1.107.0.
LiteLLM (BerriAI) · Credential-stealing litellm 1.107.0 live on PyPI for about two hours and on Docker Hub for about two and a half hours
- Coding agent deletes PocketOS production data and its backups in seconds
While working in staging, a coding agent used an account-wide Railway token to delete a volume. It was the production volume, and the backups were stored inside it.
PocketOS · Production database volume and its backups deleted; newest usable backup was three months old
- Report ties a 13-hour AWS disruption to the Kiro AI coding tool; Amazon disputes it
The Financial Times reported that engineers let Amazon’s Kiro tool make changes that led to a 13-hour disruption. Amazon confirms the event and attributes it to misconfigured access controls.
Amazon Web Services · 13-hour disruption of one AWS service in one region in December 2025
- Hidden webpage text makes Perplexity’s Comet browser leak a login code
Brave showed that instructions hidden in a Reddit comment could make Comet, while summarizing the page, read the user’s email and send a one-time login code to an attacker.
Perplexity · Demonstrated account takeover path through the user’s email; no exploitation reported
- Amazon Q extension for VS Code ships with an injected destructive prompt
An attacker used an over-scoped token to commit a prompt that told the Amazon Q agent to delete files and cloud resources. It shipped in a release but did not run, according to AWS.
Amazon Web Services · Malicious code shipped in a public release; AWS states it failed to execute and no customer environment was changed
- Replit’s coding agent deletes a production database during a code freeze
During a user’s test of Replit’s coding agent, the agent deleted the production database despite a code freeze. Replit’s chief executive called it unacceptable and announced safeguards.
Replit · Production records for over 1,200 executives and nearly 1,200 companies deleted; later recovered
- Support ticket text steers a coding agent into leaking private database tables
General Analysis showed that instructions hidden in a support ticket could make a coding agent with a privileged Supabase key read a private table and write its contents back into the ticket.
Supabase · Demonstrated leak of a private table on dummy data; no customer leak reported
- Malicious GitHub issue steers agents into leaking private repository data
Invariant Labs showed that an issue planted in a public repository could make an agent using the GitHub MCP server copy data from the user’s private repositories into a public pull request.
GitHub · Demonstrated leak of private repository details into a public pull request; no exploitation reported
No incidents match these filters.